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This paper uses an experimental field approach to investigate the pro-social 
preferences and behavior of social services providers and the behavior of potential 
beneficiaries in Bogota, Colombia. Field experiments were conducted using 
games including a newly designed Distributive Dictator Game in order to 
examine traits and mechanisms guiding pro-sociality.  Replicating the patterns of 
previous studies, individuals showed a preference for fair outcomes, positive 
levels of trust and reciprocity, and willingness to punish unfair outcomes. The 
results provide evidence that the poor trigger more pro-social behavior from all 
citizens, including public servants, but the latter display strategic generosity. 
Additional observations include a bias in favor of women and households with 
more dependents, but discriminatory behavior against stigmatized groups.
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1. Introduction 
 
State provision of social services to the poor is contained in an exchange relationship where one 
could expect that a local officer, representing the state’s social welfare function, delivers services 
to the poor, based on limited resources that need to be allocated according to criteria compatible 
with the state’s priorities. In turn, the state’s priorities are supposed to reflect the social choice 
preferences of citizens-voters with respect to redistribution and assistance to the poor. 
Because of the nature of this relationship, where private information and coordination 
failures can emerge, the quality and distribution of those services are subject to potential 
problems of efficiency and equity when local officers deliver services that are not compatible 
with the social welfare function. For instance, providers may include particular groups that 
should not receive services, or exclude others that should be covered. Further, there is room for 
corruption and misallocation of resources for private interests. In general, there is a principal-
agent problem, and observation of the provider’s actions can be costly.  
We therefore rely to some extent on the moral, normative, and self-regulatory systems in 
the individual preferences of the local officer. The (private) decisions by the local officer are 
mediated by her individual social preferences with respect to altruism, reciprocity, trust and 
distributive justice towards the beneficiaries of social programs. These traits and mechanisms, 
we believe, capture most of the important aspects of pro-social behavior that provide the basis of 
the social contract and public policies aimed at helping the most vulnerable groups in society. 
If the social preferences of the local officers are well aligned with the social welfare 
function of the policy being implemented, the outcomes will be socially desirable in terms of 
efficiency and equity. Otherwise, scarce resources targeted at the poor can be misallocated 
affecting the effectiveness of the policy. 
This study is precisely aimed at the understanding of the micro foundations of the 
interactions involved in the provision of social services to the poor. In particular, the study uses 
an experimental field approach to better understand the preferences and behavior of both 
individuals involved in the provision of social services and the behavior of those potential 
beneficiaries, the poor.  
Pro-social preferences are essential for understanding behavior in social exchanges where 
there is room for strategic use of private information, which may lead to losses in social 
efficiency and equity. Such is the case when agents (e.g., public officials) have to deliver   5
services to the poor on behalf of the principal (e.g., policymakers and citizen-voters). Thus, we 
have chosen to implement a battery of canonical experiments used for measuring social 
preferences (Bowles, 2004; Camerer and Fehr, 2004) in order to capture a series of components 
of pro-sociality, namely, distributive justice, altruism, reciprocity, reciprocal altruism, fairness, 
trust and social sanctioning. These are all essential elements within a social contract that, as in 
Colombia, expects to deliver social services to the more vulnerable groups of society. 
We want to explore the foundations of pro-social behavior by public officials as well as 
the poor in the delivery of social services (education, health services and nutrition). Dimensions 
like altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion, trust, distributive justice and social sanction are all 
important in the understanding the reasons why as a society we target resources towards the 
poor. However, these dimensions might be influenced by factors that should—and others that 
should not—guide the allocation of resources (e.g., level of education or number of dependents 
as opposed to race or marital status). Discretion on the part of public officials might lead to 
discrimination against certain groups, creating social losses in terms of equity and efficiency in 
the allocation of scarce public resources. In addition, the poor who are actual or potential 
beneficiaries of the social programs might also self-discriminate if their expectations about such 
processes of discrimination affect their expectations or application towards such services. 
Our experimental strategy emerges from the hypothesis that allocation of resources to the 
poor is mediated by a) the social preferences and behavior of the local officials in charge of the 
provision, and b) the preferences and behavior of the potential beneficiaries that could affect 
self-selection and self-discrimination. The overall null hypothesis is that public officials will 
allocate resources according to the constitutional mandate and the objectives of the particular 
features of the specific public policy, which is, based on the attributes of the recipients that guide 
the redistributive goal of the social policy. The null hypothesis also implies that according to the 
constitutional mandate there should be no discrimination against certain groups based on their 
race, ethnicity, occupation, marital status or other particular conditions (e.g., being displaced—
desplazado—by violence from their previous residence to the city).  
Using the experimental designs and the collection of data on recruited subjects, we are 
able to capture a significant portion of public officials’ motivations when allocating resources, as 
well as the motivations of the poor when expressing their expectations and observing their 
realized outcomes both outside our lab and during our experiments.   6
We designed a battery of five two-person games where there are players 1 who represent 
public officials who allocate resources to provide social assistance or aid to players 2 (the poor) 
based on the socio-demographic characteristics of the latter. The games designed for the study 
were a “Distributive Dictator Game (DDG), a Dictator Game (DG), Strategy Method Ultimatum 
Game (UG), Trust Game (TG), and a Third Party Punishment game (3PP).
3  
As far as we can recollect, there are no previous experimental studies on other-regarding 
or pro-social behavior with such samples of participants (actual public officials and actual 
beneficiaries of these programs). Each of our participants took part in a session with all five 
games, but interacted with different people in each game, on only a few occasions repeating the 
interaction with the same player. All games were played as one-shot interactions, with no 
communication or pre-play interaction among players. In all cases players had partial 
information about the socio-demographic characteristics of each other. 
We recruited both target (actual public officials) and control subjects (students, 
government and private sector employees, etc) for players 1. Likewise, we had target and control 
samples of subjects for players 2 who receive the transfers of resources from players 1. Target 
participants were recruited in welfare programs’ waiting lines, on the streets and in various 
neighborhoods in the lower income groups. Controls were recruited among students and 
employees. We also had a fifth game where there is a third player who judges and allocates 
resources to punish behavior considered anti-social. These third players were recruited among 
the overall population. 
The target sample participating in the study comes from public officials working for 
different government organizations and from beneficiaries from education, health, nutrition and 
childcare programs in different locations in the city of Bogota. The data for the entire set of 
experimental and survey data contains information on a total sample of 513 subjects who 
attended the entire set of experimental activities. Although we recruited a total of 568 people, for 
various reasons 55 of them did not show up for the games stage. All recruited people were given 
US$0.60 as part of their show-up fee in order to induce credibility and to subsidize the 
transportation cost from their homes or workplace to the campus site we assigned for the 
experiments stage. Once they decided to participate and attended their sessions, they were paid 
                                            
3 All but the last experiment involve a player 1 (provider) and a player 2 (beneficiary). For the Third-Party 
Punishment game there is a third player who decides whether to punish at a personal cost player 1 when the latter 
has acted unfairly against player 2.   7
the rest of their earnings based on the decisions in the experiments. An additional US$0.60 was 
paid to each participant to cover her transportation cost back home. On average each participant 
in the role of player 1 was paid US$6.60, and US$3.75 was paid to players 2 and 3. 
As an overview of the main findings, the experiments provide evidence for the following 
results: 
 
•  Our average participant showed pro-social behavior,
4 consistent with most of 
the behavioral and experimental literature, including,  
o  Distributive justice towards the more vulnerable (favoring the weakest or 
more in need);  
o  Altruism (unselfish transfers towards others at one’s own cost);  
o  Reciprocal altruism and reciprocity (willingness to treat others as one 
would expect towards self);  
o  Trust followed by reciprocity (people being trusted showed higher levels 
of reciprocity by returning with positive returns the initial investment);  
o  Social sanctioning (willingness to sanction third parties at a personal cost 
because of unfair behavior). 
o  As in most experimental literature with non-student samples, the 50/50 
split of endowments for the Dictator, Ultimatum and Third-Party 
Punishment games was the most frequent division. 
•  When our players 1 and 2 were both from target samples 2) such levels of pro-
social behavior were statistically larger in favor of the poor, if compared with 
our control samples. We believe this provides evidence of the internal validity 
of the experimental design, and confirms that our design was clear for players 
1 with respect to the social needs of their counterparts. 
•  When players 2 were from our target sample, pro-sociality increased for all 
players 1, target and controls. 
•  However, when our senders or players 1 were controls and players 2 were 
targets, offers and pro-social actions in general were even greater than when 
players 1 were from our target samples, namely, public servants. This result 
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raised an interesting question: why would target players 1 (actual public 
servants) be less generous than their controls? We do not believe that public 
officials engaged in social services to the poor are less pro-social, but instead, 
that they incorporate more strategic factors into their decisions regarding the 
recipients of transfers. For instance, public officials reward education and 
shorter time of unemployment among players 2. Further, using a survey 
questionnaire for estimating an index of humanitarian-egalitarian preferences, 
and for Protestant work ethic (Fong et al., 2005; Katz and Hass, 1989), we 
found that our target public officials showed higher levels of these two 
indicators than their controls. 
•  When explaining variation in offers and pro-social actions by players 1 we 
found a set of attributes from players 2 that triggered or reduced pro-social 
behavior from the former to the latter: 
o  Women, with larger numbers of dependents, more so if minors, received 
higher altruistic offers than men. 
o  Black and indigenous people received higher or equal offers but never 
lower offers than other racial groups. 
o  Occupation, social condition or current activity seemed to affect offers. 
The unemployed as well as those with less education were treated with 
more generosity, but street recyclers and street vendors were often sent 
lower offers, confirming anecdotal evidence of stigmatization and 
suspicion towards certain activities.  
o  The political conflict manifests itself in the results. People displaced from 
violence were given higher offers, while ex-combatants were given lower 
offers, controlling for the rest of the socio-demographic characteristics of 
these particular samples. 
o  In fact, we found a systematic discrimination against ex-combatants not 
only in the offers sent to them in the Dictator and Ultimatum games, but 
also when third parties were less willing to punish unfair behavior towards 
ex-combatants.   9
•  Our target groups of players 2 showed higher levels of conformism than their 
controls. First, they were willing to accept more unfair offers in the Ultimatum 
game, that is, their rejection rates were lower for unfair offers. 
•  We also found that on average expected offers by players 2 from players 1 
were slightly but consistently lower than actual offers. However, in all games 
the expected and actual offers were positively correlated. 
 
Overall, we have been able to replicate the pattern of similar experiments regarding pro-
social behavior such as altruism, reciprocity, fairness, altruistic punishment and social norms 
across the world (Henrich et al., 2004, 2006; Gintis et al 2005; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Cárdenas 
and Carpenter, 2006). However, we have explored a particular context of social exchange in 
which states undertake tasks of helping the poor through local officials’ decisions and how their 
individual preferences may affect outcomes. 
 
2.   Discretion and Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services 
 
Discrimination and social exclusion in various domains of economic life can create losses in 
terms of efficiency and equity. Particular characteristics of individuals, many of which they did 
not choose during their lives but had for different genetic or acquired reasons, cause them to be 
excluded from receiving the benefits of certain social exchange situations regarding the market, 
the state, or their life in community. Such exclusion creates efficiency losses in many cases, and 
equity problems in general, as credit, land and labor markets are subject to discrimination and 
exclusion. The political arena can also exclude people from expressing their preferences and 
affecting the outcomes on their favor. 
Much of the theoretical and empirical literature can be classified into two major 
approaches, “statistical discrimination” (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972) and the “taste for 
discrimination” (Becker, 1971) which have focused on imperfect markets where room for 
discrimination can affect economic outcomes.
5 The housing and labor markets are among the 
most frequently studied domains in the discrimination literature. Experiments, audit studies, 
surveys and other methods have been used for exploring how workers can be discriminated 
against in labor contracts and job application processes. Race and gender have been 
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systematically tested as characteristics where discrimination can occur and create equity and 
efficiency losses. Housing and credit markets have also been subject to different inquiries 
regarding discrimination.  
Less studied, however, have been issues of discrimination in the non-market domains of 
social services provision, particularly to the poor. Social programs aimed at improving access to 
education, health, and childcare for the poor are good examples of these settings. As in imperfect 
markets, the provision of public goods and social services by the state can also be subject to 
discrimination, with certain individuals treated in a less favorable way than others with 
equivalent constitutional rights or under the same provider and location. Unfortunately, being 
poor often coincides with having some of the characteristics for which individuals are 
discriminated against and excluded. Indigenous and Afro-descendents frequently appear among 
the poorest and excluded in the Latin American region, and therefore are more vulnerable. 
Migrants (campesinos) from rural areas additionally suffer various kinds of discrimination when 
seeking access to the same services that others have received in the past.  
Latin America, as one of the world’s most unequal regions but also one of the most 
diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, and social backgrounds, imposes special challenges with 
respect to discrimination and social exclusion. Furthermore, the region is undergoing a dramatic 
transformation in terms of urban-rural dynamics that create particular problems we have yet to 
understand in depth. Persistent rural poverty and inequality, the economic changes in the 
agricultural sector, cultural change, political conflicts and civil wars have created a migration to 
the cities that imposes a challenge to the provision of public goods and social services by the 
state, particularly to the poorest, who are increasing the metropolitan populations of the region. 
Meanwhile, decentralization and devolution of the state create also greater challenges to local 
governments in providing these services to the poor in cities that are evolving into worlds within 
worlds, with wealthy neighborhoods and slums with severe social needs to be fulfilled. Thus, 
political tensions in the developing and developed world emerge when the excluded can observe 
within their cities that others have access to public goods and social services.  
Governments have responded with systems of focalization to target the very poor, 
creating survey procedures and algorithms to rank poor households for the distribution of such 
social services. Many of those programs, labeled as SISBEN
6 (Irarrázabal, 2004) are in place in 
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the region, as mechanisms for the targeting of social protection programs. In fact, those programs 
are aimed at targeting the most vulnerable in an attempt to positively discriminate with 
redistributive goals. Yet room remains for negative discrimination and exclusion. Irarrázabal 
(2004) recognizes this as one of the two risks of these indices of focalization of beneficiaries 
when some individuals remain excluded because of manipulation of the information emerges, 
and his estimations suggest that these problems may exist in the cases of Chile and Colombia. 
Some of these could occur because of discrimination, but the evidence cannot be used to support. 
Núñez and Espinosa (2005) also find statistical support from the Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 
2004 in Colombia that there might be errors of inclusion (households that should not and are 
receiving subsidies) and errors of exclusion (households in need excluded), discriminating 
against households with elderly persons and persons displaced by violence, as well as households 
heads with low levels of education. 
Gaviria and Ortiz (2005) provide statistical evidence for Colombia suggesting that 
minorities may be asymmetrically assisted, for instance, in the subsidized health program. Using 
self-reported data for ethnicity, they find that the indigenous have higher likelihoods of being 
included in the state-subsidized health program
7 than Afro-descendants, controlling for other 
factors such as location, education, age, consumption and employment. The causalities, however, 
are still undefined. One plausible reason is that greater amounts of national government transfers 
flow to areas with larger fractions of indigenous groups if compared to those with Afro-
descendants. Also, the indigenous have a longer tradition of social cohesion and organization for 
asserting their rights before the government when compared to Afro-descendants who only 
during the new constitutional process have engaged in social organization and collective action. 
There is the possibility that discrimination explains a process in which Afro-descendants are less 
likely than others to enter the social protection program given the steps involved in targeting, 
enrollment and service delivery.  
Further, there is documented evidence in sentences from the Constitutional Court in 
Colombia
8 using the mechanism of the tutela,
9 where individuals who have been classified 
erroneously argue that their rights and the principle of equality have been violated in their 
classification into the SISBEN indexing system.  
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8 http://www.ramajudicial.gov.co, http://200.21.19.133/sentencias/ 
9 “writ of protection of constitutional rights”   12
In general, there are behavioral issues that are at the core of the problem. For instance, if 
there is a “taste for discrimination,” those who generate discrimination (e.g., employers) will 
have to show it in their other-regarding preferences, which could be validated empirically, or 
experimentally. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) have devised a clever experiment in the field, 
randomly sending constructed resumes in response to newspaper ads for job postings, and 
observing the probability of being called for an interview to test for discrimination in the labor 
markets based on prejudices emerging from the names used, and without photos or ethnic 
background. The results were astonishing: not only did being identified as Black decrease the 
probability of getting an interview, but the marginal gains from other characteristics such as 
education and home location mattered more strongly for resumes with a “white” name. The 
application of those results, however, would be limited to explaining the thoughts and behaviors 
of those deciding to call applicants for an interview. 
As for the case of government programs that provide social protection to the poor, rather 
little has been said about the behavioral aspects of local officials’ decision-making. We can agree 
that programs and policies aimed at helping the poor are based on pro-social preferences of the 
majority that vote and thus elect and appoint officials that will run those programs. Still, the 
contract between officials and the electorate is incomplete and subject to asymmetries of 
information. In addition, the individual preferences of those in government and executing the 
programs are in many cases unobservable.  
Yet if we recognize that we are in a world of imperfect markets and public goods 
problems, the role of the state, as evidenced by its representatives’ behavior and preferences, is 
crucial. As eloquently stated by Bowles and Gintis (2000) “Many are now convinced that John 
Stuart Mill's injunction that we must devise rules such that the ‘duties and the interests’ of 
government officials would coincide should be shelved, along with the assumptions of the 
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, in the museum of utopian designs.” 
 
3.  Motivations from the Field 
 
Previous to the experimental sessions, we reviewed at least two important sources of data 
regarding violations of constitutional rights based on discrimination. One is the Constitutional 
Court, and the other is the Defensoría del Pueblo. Both of these gave us an idea of the type of 
framing we wanted to construct in our protocols and also in the design of the recruitment strategy   13
across public agencies and geographical locations in the city.
10 These data show an increase in 
the number of cases that allege discriminatory actions from the state and provide some clues for 
the kind of characteristics we may include in the treatment and control variables for our 
experiments. 
In regards to the purpose of this study and based on the results, we introduce into the 
random sample shares of demographic features that are subject to discrimination. Between those 
shares, we decide to include in the sample the category of “Reinsertados,”
11 because in the 
process of this inquiry we found numerous cases in which this population has experienced social 
exclusion when they applied for a social service.  
The experimental strategy for this project emerges from the hypothesis that 
discrimination in the provision of social services to the poor is mediated by a) the social 
preferences and behavior of the local officials in charge of the provision, and b) the preferences 
and behavior of the potential beneficiaries that could affect self-selection and self-discrimination. 
Therefore, we need to design an experiment where these two players (service providers and 
beneficiaries) interact and are informed by the characteristics that might be affecting the strategic 
behavior in the interaction. Some of those characteristics are supposed to guide the decisions of 
the providers in the correct direction, i.e., aligned with a social welfare function that reflects their 
society’s preferences, but there are characteristics that may bias behavior towards discriminatory 
outcomes and against the constitutional mandate. 
                                            
10  The Constitutional Court has made a number of rulings based on the mechanism of the tutela, to command public 
institutions to guarantee social services to the poor. We found the following type of sentences: 1) individuals who 
have been classified erroneously in SISBEN arguing that their rights and the principle of equality have been violated 
in their classification into the SISBEN indexing system; 2) displaced people who argue for equal treatment when 
asking for social services such as health care and medicines, education for their children, housing and economic 
stabilization programs and child care; 3) displaced people who argue for registration as displaced (to obtain the 
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The Colombian Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo) has heard a number of allegations in which poor 
people claimed to be subject of social exclusion in the provision of social services. We found 100 accusations out of 
1,123 that described possible circumstances in which poor people could have experienced discrimination by local 
officials involved in providing social services. Among the cases of alleged discrimination, 52 percent involved  
institutions that provide health  care, 20  percent involved educational institutions, 20 percent featured problems 
with SISBEN surveyors, 6 percent involved claims with institutions that provide nutrition, and 2 percent involved 
disputes with child care institutions. Those who allege discrimination possess the following socio-demographic 
characteristics (totals add up to more than 100 percent because of multiple characteristics): 64 percent were women, 
46 percent were unemployed or working at home, 9 percent were displaced, 30 were handicapped, citizens, and 7 
percent were from other parts of the country and/or indigenous or Afro-descendants.   
11 “Reinsertados” is a common name used to identify ex-combatants from irregular armed forces who are in a 
process of reinsertion into civil life through government programs that provide support of various kinds.   14
The context and frame of the game is rather simple: a government program, inspired by a 
constitutional mandate and a policy design, involves a social welfare function that needs to be 
executed by local officials who will aim at improving the well-being of the target population, in 
this case, the poor, through their privately observed actions. These local officials will allocate 
scarce resources and that allocation will affect beneficiaries’ wellbeing.  In some cases, the latter 
will have room for strategic responses that may affect their own outcomes or even those of local 
officials. 
Any local official’s behavior is expected to reflect the social welfare function of the 
government plan, but such officials, as agents whose behavior is only partially observable to the 
principal (the government agency), may not act entirely according to the social objective and 
may include behavioral responses that reflect their own personal social preferences and biases. In 
particular, preferences towards social equity, ethnic or racial equity, among others, can affect the 
behavior of local officials during the process of application and provision of social services to 
the poor. 
In various ways, local officials act as bounded dictators who assign resources to 
beneficiaries of social programs within a certain set of rules but also with some discretion in their 
actions. Their choices—only partially observable to the principal—affect the way funds are 
allocated and distributed among different social target groups subject to discrimination and 
biases of various kinds.  On the other hand, the social preferences of the poor can also be factors 
that influence the possibilities of discrimination. Social groups that expect to be discriminated 
against may be more tolerant of unfair or unequal allocations. If in equilibrium such norms are 
replicated and widespread spread, local officials can find morally acceptable to act accordingly 
and sustain current levels of discrimination without personal costs. 
 
3.1 Norms and Behavioral Mechanisms: Distributive Justice, Altruism, Inequity Aversion, 
Trust and Reciprocity 
 
There are various dimensions that lie at the core of the social exchange that occurs in the process 
of providing social services to the poor. These dimensions are critical in the interactions among 
the government program (the Principal), the local official (the Agent) that is in charge of 
executing the program, and the beneficiary (the recipient) of the social service. These dimensions 
include altruism, distributive justice, inequity aversion, trust, and reciprocity. Altruism and   15
inequity aversion are at the core of the justification for pro-poor redistributive programs. The 
voter preferences are thus reflected in the design of government programs and the local officials 
are expected to implement such programs that increase the well-being of the poorest and that 
reduce social inequalities. However, that process can be affected by discrimination against 
certain social groups (e.g., racial or ethnic group). Such discrimination, which in theory should 
not occur if the programs are designed in accordance with the constitutional mandate, can in fact 
occur because of the discretionary role that local officials have in the application, approval and 
provision process. 
Trust and Reciprocity are important mechanisms in a relationship that involves the 
possibility of gains or losses because of coordination failures, interdependence or externalities. 
The provision of public goods, or the co-financing of public projects between the state and the 
community, depends on mutual trust for the optimization of available resources. Reciprocity can 
sustain cooperation or destroy it in the provision of public goods that are crucial to the poor. 
Once again, preferences that involve discrimination against certain groups can limit trust or 
trigger negative reciprocity, reducing the social efficiency of pro-poor programs. 
In this study we conduct standard and modified experiments in the field that have been 
used widely for detecting and measuring degrees of altruism, inequity aversion, trust and 
reciprocity. Through these field experiments we will observe and measure the degrees of 
discrimination that may affect these dimensions by conducting treatment and control sessions 
where we provide information to players about features of their counterparts in the experiment 
(e.g., gender, status, race, ethnicity, origin, occupation, family composition).  
However, our protocols include a mild framing in every task where players are told that 
the game situation is similar to that where people request social services at local public agencies. 
We expect both the providers and the recipients to be familiar with such interactions, though 
from a different standpoint. Nevertheless, decisions remain private and confidential, maintaining 
the discretionary nature of allocation decisions on the part of public officials as well as response 
strategies on the part of beneficiaries. The five experiments selected and the reasons for 
including them are as follows:  
   16
•  (DDG) Distributive Dictator Game:
12 Player 1 receive a fixed payment of, 
say, $10 as a salary for performing the following allocation task: She needs to 
rank five players 2 in the order in which they will receive each a fixed 
payment or voucher of $10 determined by a random distribution from one to 
five possible payments. The random number of vouchers between one and 
five will decide the first N players 2 who will receive the $10. The remaining 
players receive nothing. Player 1 observes cards for the five players 2 that 
include a picture of their faces and basic information on those players’ 
demographic and socio-economic conditions.  
o  With this game we aim at measuring preferences for distributive justice, 
mediated by the characteristics of the beneficiaries, including those not 
associated with deservedness but rather discrimination. 
•   (DG) Dictator Game (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986; Forsythe et 
al. 1994): Player 1 decides on the distribution of a fixed amount of $20 and 
sends a fraction to player 2, who receives that amount. Player 1 keeps the 
remaining part for herself. 
o  This game provides information about pure altruism, that is, willingness to 
decrease one’s well-being for increasing the well-being of another. 
•  (UG) Ultimatum Game (Güth et al., 1982): Player 1 (proposer) decides on 
the distribution of a fixed amount and sends a fraction to player 2 (responder) 
who receives that amount. If accepted by the responder, the distribution 
happens; if rejected, both players receive zero and the money returns to the 
experimenter. 
o  The Ultimatum Game provides information on equity, reciprocal fairness 
and reciprocity as mechanisms for enforce social norms. Negative 
reciprocity and conformism can be critical for understanding the social 
preferences of both local officers and beneficiaries of social programs. 
•  (TG) Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995): Both players 1 and 2 are endowed 
with $8. Player 1 (proposer) can send a fraction of her initial endowment to 
                                            
12 The design for this game has been the result of a valuable exchange with the research team and Catherine Eckel 
(University of Texas at Dallas).    17
player 2 (responder). The amount sent is tripled before it reaches Player 2, 
who then decides how to split the tripled amount plus her initial endowment 
between herself and player 1. 
o  The Trust or Investment Game offers critical information on trust and 
trustworthiness, which is critical in augmenting efficiency in the provision 
of public goods. 
•  (3PP) Third-Party Punishment (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004): This game 
is based on the Dictator Game (above) but includes a third party, player 3, 
who receives an additional endowment she can keep for herself or use for 
punishing player 1 if player 3 considers the action of player 1 as punishable 
due to fairness or justice considerations. Player 3 can punish by spending part 
of her endowment to reduce the payoffs of Player 1. 
o  This game captures preferences for costly punishment of socially 
undesirable outcomes and willingness to punish unfair actions. 
 
For any pair of players, each of these games are conducted as one-shot (1 round) with an exit 
survey on demographic, behavioral and psychological questions for control of the individual 
behavior observed in the experiments. All players 1 made decisions on all five games, and all 
players 2 were involved in each of the five games. Players 3 participated only in the last game 
(3PP). Below we describe in detail how the experimental sessions were conducted. The 
Appendix includes a detailed description of the experimental design of one session, information 
on the lab setting, and the samples. Protocols are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
4.1  Data and Results 
 
4.1 Sample of Participants 
 
We contacted a total of 568 people as players 1, 2, and 3, including both target and control 
subjects. Of the 568 recruited, 55 people ( 9.7 percent) did not show up for the game stage 
although they had received Col.$2,000 as part of the show-up fee, which represented a sign of 
commitment on the part of the researchers and provided assistance for the cost of commitment 
and help for transportation costs to the games location. For various reasons some did not show 
up. We attempted to contact them again, and some had reported false phone numbers, could not   18
come at the time because of unexpected family or work events, or expressed to friends or other 
participants that they believed the study was a hoax.
13 In fact, almost 18 percent of the recruited 
players 2 did not show up. Also, these people had to make the longest trips across the city to 
attend the games and would be more likely to have doubts regarding the exercise’s credibility.  
Summarizing the five games, Table 1 illustrates the number of observations obtained in 
our sample, the players involved and the Nash equilibria prediction for each game based on 
backward induction for self-oriented (selfish) players. 
 















Total Observations  1,130  729  729  728  486 
Players involved in the game 
1, 
A,B,C,D,E 1,2  1,2  1,2  1,2,3 
Maximum social efficiency 
($COL)  $60,000 $20,000  $20,000  $32,000  $30,000 
Self-oriented maximizer 
prediction for  Player 1 offers 
(Nash equil) 
N.A. $0  $1,000  $0  $0 
 
TRM: 1US$=COL$2,490.66 (Monthly mean average for May to July 2006. http//:www.banrep.gov.co) 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
This table above should be used as the benchmark point for each of the games. 
Depending on the game the maximum social efficiency is achieved depending on chance (DDG), 
player 1’s choice (TG), player 2’s choice (UG) or automatically (DG, 3PP). Likewise, the level 
of equality achieved will depend on chance (DDG), player 1’s choices (DG, UG, TG, 3PP) or 
player 2’s choices (UG, TG). Players 3 decide on both efficiency and equity when choosing 
whether to punish players 1. 
 
Based on these benchmarks, we report below the descriptive statistics for the offers sent 
by players 1, followed by average behavior for players 2 and 3. Later we will explore how 
                                            
13 We have, however, data for the 55 people who did not attend.    19
variation in these decisions could be explained by the attributes of the participants in the 
experiments. 
 
4.2 Average Offers: Target vs. Control Groups 
 
The following four-panel figure compares  the results of average amounts offered by players 1 to 
players 2, in percentages of the initial endowment, by type of sub-sample (target vs. control), and 
across the four games that involved sending an amount from an initial endowment (DG, UG, TG, 
3PP). The panels also include the average amount offered by player 1 and the expected offer that 
player 2 reported before knowing the actual value. We have also included the average reported 
for several international studies with these experiments, as reported in Cárdenas and Carpenter 
(forthcoming). The upper left panel (target-target) corresponds to the interactions where both 
player 1 and the player 2 were our target samples of public officials and the poor, respectively. 
An overview of the amounts offered suggests that for all treatments there is a strong trend 
towards fairness: DG, UG and 3PP games involve a player 1 who decides how much to send 
from an initial endowment of Col$20,000. Offers fall within a 40 percent to 60 percent range for 
these three games. Further, the Ultimatum game, as expected, increased offers from Dictator 
given the possibility of punishment by player 2 who could reject the offer and “burn” the entire 
amount.  The trust game (TG) illustrates another dimension of pro-sociality where player 1 can 
trust player 2 and expect the latter to reciprocate, creating a larger and fairly distributed pie. In 
the case of the third-party punishment we observe again generosity from player 1, but mediated 
by the possibility of a player 3 who could punish player 1.  
Notice that in general the offers observed are higher than the international averages 
observed for such games. The reader must remember that our design involves a framing of 
providing services to the poor and that our non-random sample of players 2 should on average 
trigger generosity from players 1 if compared with the canonical design of these games where 
the interactions happen among peers.
14 
                                            
14 Brañas (2006) is an exception.   20
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Source: Authors’ compilation. International offers were calculated through data presented by Cárdenas and 
Carpenter (2006).  
 
 
We find that when players 2 belong to the target group, the amount of money received is 
higher than the amounts received by their control groups. On the other hand, control players 1 
send more money than target players 1 to target players 2. It is interesting to note that players 2’s 
expectations also follow this pattern, that is, the target players 2 expect more money from the 
control players 1 than from target players 1. 
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Our four-treatment design appears to be internally valid. Pro-sociality was higher when 
players 2 were from the target samples than from the controls.  Both control and target players 1 
sent higher amounts to players 2 belonging to the target sample. The experimental protocol, 
which was framed within the situation of a social service provision program, was successful 
because players 1 were able to distinguish between control and target players 2 (see the 
Appendix for protocols). Control players 2 had the same expectations as target players 2 since 
they expected less money from target players 1 than control players 1. It remains an open 
question whether lower expected offers by target players 1 were based on pro-social motivations 
on the part of players 2 or on lower expectations because of lower pro-social motivations 
expected by players 2 about players 1. It is also important to notice that offers and expectations 
in this project are higher than the international offers when target players 2 are involved in the 
interaction. Nonetheless, offers for control players 2 do not differ greatly from international 
reports.  
 
4.3 Were Expectations Met Regarding Offers? 
 
In general, we can observe that Players 2’s expectations regarding the amounts of money sent by 
players 1 are lower than the real amount of money sent for most of the games. However, the two 
variables are positively correlated, as shown in the next table, with small but significant 
coefficients. The regression analysis further ahead will provide more clues for the reasons and 
behavioral motivations for these results.  
 
Table 2. Correlations between Offers and Expected Values 
Variables Correlation
DG offered 
DG expected  0.1398* 
UG offered 
UG expected  0.1318* 
TG offered 
TG expected  0.1473* 
3PP offered 
3PP expected  0.1339* 
 
* 1% Level of significance. 
 Source: Authors’ compilation. 
   22
It is quite remarkable how players 2 were able to partially predict their received offers. We will 
further discuss this result along with others in order to explore how there might be certain norms 
of fair and unfair treatment towards certain social groups. 
 
4.4 Reciprocity and Reciprocal Altruism 
 
The rates of rejections in the Ultimatum Game are also key variables for explaining how social 
preferences affect behavior. If players 1 expect players 2 to have stronger social preferences 
towards altruism, fairness and equity, players 1 should increase their offers in comparison to the 
Dictator game. 
The next figure shows the rejection rates of the Ultimatum game for all four treatments. 
Given that we conducted the game using the Strategy Method, we were able to capture schedules 
of decisions by each player 2 for each possible offer from player 1. 
 
Figure 2. Rate of Rejection in UG 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. The average of international rejections was calculated through data presented by 
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As in the existing literature, rejection rates are quite high for very unfair offers from 
players 1. Such rejection rate decreases as offers increase, and reach the minimum level for the 
most fair offer of 50/50. Notice that the rejection rate slightly increases with offers being 
excessively generous (see Henrich et al., 2004, for a discussion of hyper-fairness in small-scale 
societies). 
We additionally observe a higher level of rejection rates for the treatment where both 
players 1 and 2 were controls. In other words, when players 2 were target (poor) we observed 
lower levels of rejection, that is, higher levels of conformism with unfair outcomes. Recall that in 
our previous result we showed that players’ expectations were correlated with actual offers. If 
players 1 think strategically that players 2 were more or less tolerant towards certain offers, the 
offers in this game would be generally accepted. 
 
4.5 Trust and Reciprocity 
 
In the following figure we show the amounts returned by players 2 as a response to different 
offers sent by players 1. Both are shown in percentages to allow for comparability. The results 
once again replicate most of the literature (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995; Cárdenas and 
Carpenter, 2006). On average, trust from player 1 is rewarded with higher returns from player 2 
to player 1. With these percentages it is easy to see that for all cases the rate of return on the 
investment is greater than unity. However, the controls returned higher amounts to players 1 than 
target players 2. This could be interpreted as meaning that target players 2 claim more rights the 
transferred amounts given the framing of the experiment where these transactions were capturing 
social service provision programs towards the poor. It is also interesting, however, that players 2 
(target) were also more generous than their controls when sending back money to players 1 when 
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Source: Authors’ compilation. The average of international returns was calculated through data presented by 
Cárdenas and Carpenter (2006). 
 
 
4.6 Third Party Punishment: Altruistic Punishment 
 
Finally, we present the results for the rates of punishment by players 3. Recall that players 3 only 
played this game and no other. They were showed the offers by players 1 to players 2 and then 
decided or not to punish at a cost. (They could spend $2,000 pesos of their $10,000 endowment 
to have the experimenter take away from player 1 $6,000). The sample of players 3 were 
recruited from among the overall population, including both students and non-students. 
The figure shows the rates of punishment observed for different levels of offers by 
players 1. These data resulted from playing the game using the strategy method asking players 3 
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0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
% of Amount sent by Player 1
General Target 1,2 Control: 1 - Target: 2 Control:1,2 Av. International
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. The average of international punishment rates was calculated through data presented 
by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). 
 
The results are also consistent with existing literature on this game (Henrich et al., 2006; 
Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004)). Third parties are willing to sacrifice their own personal material 
income to punish unfair behavior by reducing the income of those engaging in unfair actions 
towards others. The rate of rejection starts at a level of 70 percent when players 1 keep their 
entire endowment and decrease as offers are larger. Interestingly, the rate of rejection drops more 
rapidly for the control-control groups while remaining steady and higher for the target groups. In 
fact, even at quite high divisions in favor of players 2, there is a percentage of players 3 willing 
to punish that players 1 who would not send most of their endowments. This result would 
complete the overall picture of socially accepted norms of fairness towards the poor and suggests 
that citizens would reject and even punish unfair behavior.  
 
4.7 Explaining Variations in Pro-Social Behavior 
 
The following OLS regressions are aimed at explaining variation in the experimental behavior as 
a function of the attributes of player 2, and also as a function of the attributes of player 1 that 
players 2 observed of players 1. 
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We tested as dependent variables the following, all measured as a percentage of the total 
possible amount in each game: 
•  Average ranking obtained in the DDG by player 2 from the rankings given by 
all players 1 who ranked that particular player 2 
•  Amounts offered by players 1 to players 2 in the DG, UG, TG and 3PP 
•  Punishments rates of players 3 
•  Also, in the Appendix we report the same regressions for the amounts 
expected by players 2. 
 
Table 3. Design of Field Sessions 
           
Method   OLS 
Dependent Variable   
Player 2’s rank in Distributive Dictator 
Game 
                
Independent Variables    (1)  (2)  (3) 
        
1 if Player 2 is a woman     0.470*    0.467* 
Player 2’s age    0.008*    0.004 
1 if Player 2 is single     -0.197**    -0.185** 
1 if Player 2 is in common law     -0.139**    -0.088 
Player 2’s years of education    -0.092*    -0.135* 
Player 2’s number of minor people in 
charge 
 




















1 if Player 2 is unemployed    0.452*    0.177* 
         
1 if Player 2 considers herself black      0.128 0.186* 
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous      0.493* 0.239* 
1 if Player 2 is Displaced      0.854* 0.287* 
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant      -0.649* -0.222** 

















1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor      -0.026 -0.13 
         
  Player 1’ - Player 2’s Household expenses per capita 
(in Colombian thousand pesos)    0.000*   0.000** 
        
Constant    2.451* 2.860* 2.760* 
Interactions    1087 1087 1087 
R-squared    0.441 0.258 0.494 
        
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%  A Cluster with Player 1’s decisions is included. 
Source: Authors.         
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Table 4. Stages of Field Session
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
1 if player 1 is Target -0.055 0.042 -0.314+ 0.021 -0.450+
1 if player 2 is Target 0.268* 0.289*
1 if player 1&2 are Target -0.119+-0.143** -0.277 0.160** -0.293
1 if player is woman -0.002 -0.042
Age -0.005* -0.003+
Player's level of education  0.051* 0.028**
Natural logarithm of Player's household expenses per capita 0.031
1 if Player works in a Health institute 0.120*
1 if Player works in an Education institute 0.035
1 if Player works in a Nutrition institute -0.070**
Player's time worked multiplied by dummy of Target P1 0.007**
Player 1's - Player 2's Household expenses per capita (in 
Colombian thousand pesos) 0 0.000** 0.000** 0.000+ 0 0 0 0 0.000**
1 if Player 2 is a woman  0.075* 0.065** 0.044 0.084 0.071 0.052 0.062
Player 2's age 0.001 0 0.001 0 -0.001 0 0
1 if Player 2 is single  0.029 0.029 0.021 -0.031 -0.027 -0.008 -0.017
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0.018 0.022 -0.012 0.009 -0.016 0.042 0.019
Player 2's years of education -0.029** -0.040* -0.036* -0.052* -0.075* -0.058* -0.070*
Player 2's number of minor people in charge 0.029* 0.029** 0.009 0.02 -0.005 0.025+ 0.017
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0.056 0.041 0.046 0.226* 0.232* 0.223* 0.247*
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0.039 0.045 0.043 -0.023 0.072 0.037 0.097+
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous 0.068 0.021 0.012 0 0 0 0
1 if Player 2 is Displaced 0.062 -0.033 -0.037 0.214* 0.073 0.061 -0.032
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant -0.069** -0.041 -0.031 -0.105 -0.128 -0.072** -0.025
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker -0.027 -0.091+ -0.024 0.041 -0.012 -0.032 -0.086+
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor -0.044 -0.071 -0.02 -0.016 -0.065 -0.028 -0.051
Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 2 from Player 1 in DG  0.053 0.135** 0.056 0.002 0.097 0.251* 0.066 0.118 0.377* 0.13
Player 2's rank given by Player 1 in DDG 0.059*
1 if Player 2 is a woman  -0.041 -0.036
Player 2´s age 0.002 0.003
1 if Player 2 is single  0.072 0.062
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0.038 0.071
Player 2's years of education 0.052** 0.069**
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge 0.007 0.039
1 if Player 2 is unemployed -0.180** -0.180**
Player 1´s - Player 2's Household expenses per capita (in 
Colombian thousand pesos) 0.000* 0.000*
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0.088 -0.026
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous 0.097+ 0.01
1 if Player 2 is Displaced -0.187**-0.160+
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant 0.051 0.131
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker -0.069 -0.096
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor 00
Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 2 from Player 1 in DG  -0.123 -0.196+ -0.1
1 if Player 2 is a woman  0- 0 . 0 1 8
Player 2's age 0.001 0.002
1 if Player 2 is single  0.041 0.047
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0.001 0.027
Player 2's years of education 0.050+ 0.056**
Player 2's number of minor people in charge -0.001 0.008
1 if Player 2 is unemployed -0.176** -0.216*
Player 1´s - Player 2's Household expenses per capita (in 
Colombian thousand pesos) 0.000* 0.000*
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0.009 -0.06
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous 0.075 0.015
Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 2 from Player 1 in DG  -0.144 -0.383* -0.161
Constant 0.433* 0.252* 0.461* 0.461* 0.526* 0.409* 0.687* 0.454* 0.834* 0.659* 0.364* 0.713* 0.145
Interactions 534 534 534 534 534 487 534 534 534 534 534 534 451
R-squared 0.095 0.189 0.137 0.051 0.151 0.21 0.213 0.1 0.24 0.212 0.08 0.227 0.191
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Table 5. Contents of Players' Cards Shown to Each Other
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
1 if player 1 is Target -0.018 0.045 -0.027 0.110+ -0.056
1 if player 2 is Target 0.206* 0.209*
1 if player 1&2 are Target -0.116**-0.118** -0.027 0.198* -0.04
1 if player is woman -0.037 -0.007
Age -0.002 0
Player's level of education  0.042* 0.027*
Natural logarithm of Player's household expenses per capita 0.015
1 if Player works in a Health institute 0.024
1 if Player works in an Education institute 0.017
1 if Player works in a Nutrition institute -0.094**
Player's time worked multiplied by dummy of Target P1 0.005+
Player 1's - Player 2's Household expenses per capita (in 
Colombian thousand pesos) 0 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0 0 0 0 0
1 if Player 2 is a woman  0.039** 0.032 0.003 0.054+ 0.049 0.04 0.039
Player 2´s age 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0 0
1 if Player 2 is single  -0.028 -0.029 -0.042 -0.001 -0.001 0.011 0.016
1 if Player 2 is in common law  -0.037 -0.044 -0.063+ -0.037 -0.03 -0.03 -0.015
Player 2´s years of education -0.016+ -0.022**-0.023** -0.039* -0.045* -0.045* -0.051*
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge 0.028* 0.027* 0.016+ 0.009 -0.002 0.01 0.01
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0.057** 0.059+ 0.054+ 0.046 0.056 0.04 0.058
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0.017 0.038 0.03 -0.026 0.048 -0.014 0.051
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous 0.056 0.01 0.004 -0.157** -0.122 -0.121 -0.133
1 if Player 2 is Displaced 0.067** -0.024 -0.043 0.120** 0.05 0.068** -0.032
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant -0.060** -0.027 -0.039 -0.013 -0.026 -0.059** -0.004
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker 0.022 0.001 0.008 0.067 0.058 0.034 0.017
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor -0.045 -0.029 0.136 -0.013 -0.003 -0.011 0.015
Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 2 from Player 1 in UG  0.002 0.102+ 0.005 -0.001 0.161+ 0.282* 0.129 0.180** 0.376* 0.177**
Player 2's rank given by Player 1 in DDG 0.024*
1 if Player 2 is a woman  -0.032 -0.038
Player 2's age -0.001 0
1 if Player 2 is single  -0.032 -0.04
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0.024 0.006
Player 2's years of education 0.034+ 0.039+
Player 2's number of minor people in charge 0.023 0.039+
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0.02 0.03
Player 1´s - Player 2's Household expenses per capita (in 
Colombian thousand pesos) 0.000+ 0.000+
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0.074 0.002
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous 0.242* 0.135
1 if Player 2 is Displaced -0.063 -0.117
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant -0.052 0.018
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker -0.035 -0.062
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor 00
Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 2 from Player 1 in UG  -0.266** -0.313* -0.229**
1 if Player 2 is a woman  -0.015 -0.024
Player 2's age 00
1 if Player 2 is single  -0.053 -0.072
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0.014 -0.016
Player 2's years of education 0.034 0.041+
Player 2's number of minor people in charge 0.022 0.022
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0.027 0.017
Player 1´s - Player 2's Household expenses per capita (in 
Colombian thousand pesos) 0.000** 0.000**
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0.066 0.009
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous 0.193** 0.148
Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 2 from Player 1 in UG  -0.297* -0.465* -0.302*
Constant 0.482* 0.290* 0.554* 0.501* 0.586* 0.568* 0.590* 0.437* 0.619* 0.606* 0.385* 0.622* 0.271
Interactions 535 535 535 535 535 489 535 535 535 535 535 535 450
R-squared 0.075 0.189 0.143 0.052 0.148 0.168 0.179 0.096 0.193 0.188 0.099 0.198 0.12
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% A Cluster with Player 1's decisions is included.
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Table 6. Location of Participants' Households
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
1 if player 1 is Target 0.097 0.141** 0.102 -0.012 -0.182
1 if player 2 is Target 0.219* 0.211*
1 if player 1&2 are Target -0.176* -0.184* 0.159 0.126** 0.127
1 if player is woman -0.062+ -0.063
Age -0.001 0
Player's level of education  0.039* 0.029**
Natural logarithm of Player's household expenses per capita -0.01
1 if Player works in a Health institute 0.02
1 if Player works in an Education institute -0.109**
1 if Player works in a Nutrition institute -0.107**
Player's time worked multiplied by dummy of Target P1 0.006
Player 1's - Player 2's Household expenses per capita (in 
Colombian thousand pesos) 00 000 00 0 0
1 if Player 2 is a woman  0.03 0.029 0.009 0.074+ 0.061 0.065 0.090**
Player 2´s age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003+ 0.001 0.002 0.002
1 if Player 2 is single  -0.022 -0.02 -0.026 0.048 0.056 0.009 0.02
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0.019 0.018 -0.006 0.054 0.029 0.028 -0.014
Player 2's years of education -0.024** -0.027+ -0.026+-0.037** -0.063* -0.029 -0.036+
Player 2's number of minor people in charge 0.009 0.002 -0.006 0.034** 0.014 0.029** 0.018
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0.128* 0.102* 0.100** 0.123** 0.091+ 0.127* 0.143*
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0.034 0.047 0.035 -0.036 0.044 0.028 0.089+
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous 0.124** 0.079 0.062 0.135* 0.235** 0.253* 0.243*
1 if Player 2 is Displaced 0.108* 0.021 0.005 0.207* 0.055 0.111* 0.018
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant -0.045 -0.011 -0.01 -0.130** -0.144 -0.046 0.005
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker 0.076 0.049 0.071 -0.007 -0.051 0.079 0.062
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor -0.131** -0.164* -0.167 -0.119+-0.142** -0.119+-0.148**
Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 2 from Player 1 in TG  0.068 0.097** 0.072 0.069 0.151+ 0.134 0.132 0.218* 0.263* 0.215*
Player 2's rank given by Player 1 in DDG 0.030*
1 if Player 2 is a woman  -0.073 -0.055
Player 2's age -0.002 0.001
1 if Player 2 is single  -0.074 -0.088
1 if Player 2 is in common law  -0.014 0.009
Player 2's years of education 0.031 0.066**
Player 2's number of minor people in charge -0.033+ -0.017
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0.011 0.024
Player 1's - Player 2's Household expenses per capita (in 
Colombian thousand pesos) 00
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0.101 0.017
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous -0.006 -0.149
1 if Player 2 is Displaced -0.126** -0.052
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant 0.112 0.186+
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker 0.105 0.144
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor 00
Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 2 from Player 1 in TG  -0.101 -0.051 -0.076
1 if Player 2 is a woman  -0.068 -0.092+
Player 2's age -0.001 -0.001
1 if Player 2 is single  -0.046 -0.059
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0.015 0.056
Player 2's years of education 0.001 0.011
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge -0.026 -0.023
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0.012 -0.031
Player 1's - Player 2's Household expenses per capita (in 
Colombian thousand pesos) 0.000+ 0.000+
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0.01 -0.052
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous -0.129**-0.163+
Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 2 from Player 1 in TG  -0.221** -0.258*-0.212**
Constant 0.528* 0.360* 0.632* 0.582* 0.619* 0.567* 0.512* 0.591* 0.694* 0.536* 0.504* 0.519* 0.726**
Interactions 537 537 537 537 537 491 537 537 537 537 537 537 450
R-squared 0.042 0.118 0.114 0.078 0.135 0.144 0.14 0.095 0.173 0.149 0.091 0.171 0.083
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% A Cluster with Player 1's decisions is included.
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Table 7. Recruitment and Attendance of Experimental Sessions 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
1 if player 1 is Target -0 0.036 -0.301+- 0.03 -0.29
1 if player 2 is Target 0.138* 0.134**
1 if player 1&2 are Target -0.123* -0.115** -0.192 0 -0.182
1 if player is woman -0.071** -0.06
Age -0.001 -0.001
Player's level of education  0.033* 0.016
Natural logarithm of Player's household expenses per capita 0.002
1 if Player works in a Health institute 0.048
1 if Player works in an Education institute 0.027
1 if Player works in a Nutrition institute -0.078+
Player's time worked multiplied by dummy of Target P1 0.006+
Player 1's - Player 2's Household 
expenses per capita (in Colombian 
thousand pesos) 0 .000** 0.000*0.000+ 0 0 0 0 0.000**
1 if Player 2 is a woman  0.092* 0.088*0.080*0.105** 0.101+ 0.075+ 0.064
Player 2´s age 0.003** 0 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.004
1 if Player 2 is single  0 0 0.024 -0.026 0.002 -0.036 -0.035
1 if Player 2 is in common law  -0 -0 -0.04 -0.142+ -0.174+-0.151+ -0.142+
Player 2´s years of education 0 -0 -0.02 -0.035 -0.01 -0.031 -0.028
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge 0 -0 -0.01 -0.041 -0.05 -0.036 -0.05
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0.081** 0.1 0.051 0.075 0.102 0.072 0.091
1 if Player 2 considers herself black -0.006 -0 -0.02 -0.114 -0.09 -0.133* -0.097
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous -0.049 -0 0.001 -0.171 0.01 -0.13 -0.045
1 if Player 2 is Displaced 0.077** 0.1 0.058 0.05 0.086 0.112* 0.084+
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant -0.090* -0 -0.07 0.003 0.067 -0.060+ -0.009
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker -0.062 -0 -0.03 0.045 0.207 -0 0.018
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor 0.007 0 0.163 0.042 0.036 0.06 0.048
Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 3 from Player 1 in 3PP  0.1 0.097+ 0.1 0.057 0.190+ 0.233**0.190+0.202**0.248* 0.198**
Player 2's rank given by Player 1 in DDG 0.001
1 if Player 2 is a woman  -0.024 -0.04
Player 2´s age 0 -0.01
1 if Player 2 is single  0.065 0.041
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0.146+ 0.184+
Player 2´s years of education 0.060+ 0.028
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge 0.057 0.053
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0.005 -0.08
Player 1's - Player 2's Household 
expenses per capita (in Colombian 
thousand pesos) 0.000** 0.000**
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0.176+ 0.124
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous 0.15 -0.01
1 if Player 2 is Displaced 0.056 -0
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant -0.102 -0.14
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker -0.083 -0.239+
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor 00
Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 3 from Player 1 in 3PP  -0.200+ -0.214+ -0.19
1 if Player 2 is a woman  0.006 0.01
Player 2's age -0.001 -0.002
1 if Player 2 is single  0.074 0.068
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0.160+ 0.155+
Player 2's years of education 0.026 0.028
Player 2's number of minor people in charge 0.053 0.058+
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0.025 -0.04
Player 1's - Player 2's Household 
expenses per capita (in Colombian 
thousand pesos) 0.000** 0.000**
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0.214** 0.156+
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous 0.11 0.035
Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 3 from Player 1 in 3PP  -0.235** -0.269*-0.228**
Constant 0.482* 0.324* 0.312*0.481*0.359*0.450* 0.532* 0.499* 0.338 0.509* 0.466* 0.504* 0.46
Interactions 428 428 428 428 428 388 428 428 428 428 428 428 282
R-squared 0.04 0.14 0.1 0.072 0.1 0.16 0.175 0.134 0.2 0.178 0.12 0.194 0.102
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Table 8. Player 1's Affiliation and Public Service Sector 
 
 Method    Probit 
 Dependent  Variable   
Punish rate - 1 if Player 3 pays for punishing 
Player 1 
           dF/dx 
Independent Variables    (1)  (2)  (3) 
           
% of money sent by P1    -0.873* -0.877*  -0.898* 
1 if player is woman    -0.005   0.005 

















Player's level of education     0.038*   0.037* 
 
 
       
1 if Player 2 is a woman      0.038  0.024 
Player 2´s age     -0.003+  -0.003 
1 if Player 2 is single      0.06  0.073+ 
1 if Player 2 is in common law      0.119  0.145 
Player 2's years of education     -0.064*  -0.059* 
1 if Player 2 is unemployed     0.059  0.068 




















Player 2's stratum     0.032  0.027 
         
1 if Player 2 considers herself black     -0.038  -0.059 
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous     -0.02  -0.003 
1 if Player 2 is Displaced     -0.023  -0.034 
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant     -0.141** -0.135** 

































1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor     -0.017  0.059 
 
 
       
1 if player is woman       -0.043 
Age      0.002 
Player's level of education        0.032** 

















Preferences for Fairness and income distribution       0.031+ 
 
 
       
Interactions   4760 
R-squared   0.2039 0.2099  0.2382 
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%     
A Cluster with Player 3's decisions is included.         
Source: Authors.         
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5. Lessons Based on the Results 
 
Several lessons may be derived from this study. Some of them relate to using these methods to 
explore questions such as the economics of poverty, discrimination and of pro-social behavior 
that can be of use for other organizations and researchers. There are also lessons regarding 
designing and implementing pro-poor social policies and the role of public servants as deliverers 
of services targeted to the poor when there is room for discretionary power.  
Recall that our framed experiment offers a context of pro-sociality towards poor or 
vulnerable groups. We expect that our recipients will trigger generosity and pro-sociality in 
general among our providers, both public officials and controls. A study by Pablo Brañas (2006) 
confirms that framing, and the attributes of the recipients of Dictator Game experiments matter 
greatly. Having actually poor recipients and even going to the extreme of having the donations of 
the dictators convert into medicines for poor nations resulted in very high offers and about two-
thirds of players 1 sending their entire endowments.  
Our study falls in between the conventional designs of unframed games among 
anonymous students and the strongly framed Brañas design. Nevertheless, what is remarkable in 
our design is not that we achieve higher than average levels of generosity, but the degree of 
variation we still observe towards the same groups of beneficiaries, and the fact that our target 
groups of public officials and the poor display several behaviors that seem to respond to the 
individual attributes of senders and recipients. 
 
5.1 Do Social Preferences Affect Public Officials’ Behavior? 
 
We think so. In general citizens and those public officials whose work is related to the provision 
of social services to the poor do manifest pro-social behavior, confirming that fairness, altruism, 
trust and social punishment are mechanisms and traits that are determinant of behavior when 
dealing with the more vulnerable. However, such behavior is affected by the characteristics of 
the recipients of the social services, and in some cases by the attributes of the providers. In some 
cases the factors that trigger greater levels of altruism and fairness are consistent with social 
policy, and in others they are not it, which raises concerns.  
In particular, we find that citizens (public officials and non-public officials) favor women 
and in particular households with lower levels of education and more minor dependents. This 
seems to be a reasonable strategy if the strengthening of human capital among the poor has been   33
proven a cost-effective strategy and if women seem to be guarantors of building such human 
capital within the household. Also, people seem to favor displaced people, also consistent with 
the country’s political context and a recent constitutional mandate by the Constitutional Court.  
On the other hand, certain attributes of recipients decreased pro-social behavior by 
players 1. Those attributes are related with occupation, marital status and background, none of 
which should result in differentiated or discriminatory treatment; being an ex-combatant, a street 
recycler, a street vendor or in common-law relationships decreased generosity from players 1. 
Interestingly, people in common-law also expected lower offers, confirming the actual amounts 
sent, but with no legal or moral foundation for such behavior and expectations. These are all 
attributes that do not necessarily decrease the deservedness of recipients of social services but do 
seem to shape the preferences of public officials and non-public officials when making their 
choices. 
Such results would open a question on whether social programs should monitor the level 
and quality of social services towards certain groups. Then again, it might be important to reduce 
or hide the collection of information on social services applicants that might be irrelevant to the 
allocation or delivery of such services when public servants make micro decisions about 
allocating scarce resources (e.g., assigning available spaces in medical attention, education, child 
care or nutrition services). 
The levels of conformism expressed in lower expected offers and lower levels of 
rejection of unfair offers for our target groups (the poor) also deserve some attention. Such 
conformism can create an equilibrium of lower levels of commitment in the provision of certain 
social services. We wonder if greater emphasis in explaining the rights of the most vulnerable 
groups in society can increase the demand for fairness in the delivery of services by creating 
stronger social norms in favor of fairness.  
There are particular groups that emerged as subject to discriminatory treatment and of 
particular importance. The population of street dwellers and homeless persons working in 
informal garbage recycling activities is significant in major cities,
15 and that population suffers 
from particular conditions of vulnerability regarding enrollment in social services, household 
basic conditions and access to health and education. Meanwhile, our results confirm a cultural 
                                            
15 The National Association of Recyclers (http://www.anr.org.co/) has an estimate of about 50,000 families that 
depend on recycling garbage from the streets.   34
stigma towards them that deserves further attention. Despite the stigma, it is interesting to notice 
that their activity and income are not based on altruistic transfer (such as begging) but on self-
employment and the provision of environmental services (recycling and reduction of disposed 
garbage); furthermore, they have been working with governmental and non-governmental 
organizations in the strengthening of self-governing institutions such as cooperatives and 
associations. 
As for the case of ex-combatants, the social punishment and lower pro-social behavior 
observed towards these groups, after controlling for their age, gender, and levels of education, 
deserves some attention. There is a current state program for the reinsertion of these young 
people into civil life based on welfare programs, but such programs contradict the social norm of 
redistributive justice that seems to be present in the society and clearly manifested across our 
samples. Favoring displaced people and punishing ex-combatants reflects the social climate of 
the junction of the country with respect to the search for peace and negotiations within an 
ongoing conflict. 
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APPENDIX 
 
a.  Field Lessons and the Use of Experimental Methods in the field 
 
Through this project we learned that working with urban subjects as public officers and 
beneficiaries is quite different than a rural project.  The first 12 sessions were the most critical 
and showed us those differences and the need to implement changes in order to adjust the 
protocols, the recruitment plan, the conduct of experiments and the disbursement of payments 
after the exercise.   
One of the main issues we encountered that many players 1 were inaccessible due to 
bureaucratic obstacles to access to the public institutions, and even when we did surmount those 
obstacles many rejected our invitations. In fact, this made the recruitment of players 1 more 
intensive than a normal process of enrollment; nonetheless, the possibility of having field 
assistants that knew social services officials facilitated contact. There were additionally cases in 
which players 1 agreed to participate in the study but, after filling out the social preferences 
survey, refused to participate. We then had to review the nature of the study and the use of  
information.  
We also encountered difficulties involving players 2. Some players 2 did not believe us, 
others did not want to be photographed, and still others took the show up fee and did not attend. 
However, we explained to every recruited person that the pictures were only for academic 
purposes. First, some people failed in showing up at the time and location we had appointed 
them because it was difficult to call them one day before the session (i.e., they did not have a 
telephone number or provided false contact information). In fact, most target group members 
most did not have a phone number or contact information. In addition, it was necessary to 
provide a snack in the middle of the sessions: given their limited means and in some instances 
lengthy commutes to and from the games location, most players 2 had not had eaten for a 
considerable time before the session and would have to wait for two to three hours after the 
session until they could eat again.   
Field assistants additionally needed to be trained to face the extreme poverty of the 
recruited samples with calm and tolerance. As many players 2 belonged to vulnerable and 
excluded groups, the administration of the demographic survey could bring to mind disturbing 
facts and memories (as in the case of displaced persons), and some questions related to 
individuals’ pasts could infringe on privacy (as in the case of ex-combatants). In addition, the   38
level of education of the target players 2 and their unfamiliarity with some concepts and 
definitions involved in the provision of social services made it difficult for them to understand 
some of the questions—itself a reflection of the gravity of the problems surrounding the effective 
provision of social services. Finally, it was very important to exercise a high level of caution in 
the recruitment of ex-combatants and displaced persons, both of whom have been affected by the 
country’s political conflict.  In order to avoid any kind of altercation we chose a location as 
neutral as possible for both groups.  
The neutrality of the experimenter presented an ongoing concern because of the risk of 
bias in individuals’ decisions when experimenters provide cues to participants. Experimental 
leaders consequently supervised and followed field assistants’ proceedings not only inside the 
sessions but also in the recruitment process.  
 
b.  Design of the Sessions 
 
The following table shows the sequence and components of the experimental sessions. The 
original design proposed for the study involved 24 people per session. Unfortunately, this design 
was very difficult to implement because of the number of people who failed to show up at the 
appointed time and location. Four sessions of 24 participants each were conducted under the 24- 
participant design for a total of 96 people. After that we split the design in two and ran sessions 
with 12 people each from then on (Designs II and III in the table). Design III is essentially the 
same as Design II except that there were more people recruited and attending such sessions and 
these persons were allowed to participate. 
These changes did not affect the basic protocol design or the instructions. First, the DDG 
game where one player 1 made decisions based on 5 players 2 remained unaltered throughout. 
Secondly, all other games (DG, UG, TG and 3PP) involved the same number of interactions and 
decisions across the designs. 
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Table 3. Stages of the Field Sessions 








J1  10 
J2  10  Design I  1,2,4 3  24 
J3  4 
72 
J1  5 
J2  5  3, 5-12  9  12 
J3  2 
108 
J1  5 
J2  5 
Design II 
13-21 (each one of 24 
people)  18 12 
J3  2 
216 
J1  5+1 
J2  5  Design III  22-28 (each one of 26 
people)  13  12 or 13 
J3  2 
163 
Total         559 
Source:  Authors’ compilation.  
 
The following table shows the sequence and components of a single experimental session 
run with 12 players.  
 
Table 4. Stages for One Field Session 
STAGE ACTIVITY  LOCATION  DATA  PRODUCED 
Stage I 
Recruitment of 5 players 2 (J2)  Streets, centers for the 
attention of target 
populations  
Invitation, Photo, Pre-game demographics 
J2, received Col.$2,000 for transportation 
as part of their show-up fee. 
  Build Cards A-B-C-D-E (J2s) from demographics  J2 Cards 
Stage II 
Recruitment of 5 players 1 (J1)  Service providers (health 
centers, public schools, 
daycare centers, community 
kitchens) 
Invitation, Pre-game demographics J1, 
received Col. $4,000 (show up fee) 
 
Game decisions (5 activities) J1s  Workplace (80%) or campus 
lab (off-hours) (20%) 
Game choices J1s 
   Build Cards 1-2-3-4-5 (J1s) from demographics  J1 Cards 
Stage III  Recruitment of 2 players 3 (J3)  Pre-game demographics J3 
  Game decisions (Activity-5) J3s  Game choices J3s 
  Matching of choices by J1s, J3s  Game outcomes 
  
Payments and exit survey J3s 
Workplace, streets, campus 
Receipts (Col.$4000, show-up fee) and 
post-game survey 
Stage IV  Game decisions (5 activities) J2s  Game choices J2s 
  Matching of choices by J1s, J2s  Game outcomes 
  
Payments and exit survey J2s 
Campus (70%) or centers for 
the attention of targeted 
populations (30%)    Receipts and post-game survey, Col$2,000 
for bus 
Stage V  Payments and exit survey J1s  Workplace  Receipts and post-game survey 
 
Note: Session involved 12 participants.  
Source:  Authors’ compilation. 
  
c.  Lab Setting 
 
The following figure describes, for one of the activities (the Ultimatum game, or activity 2) the 
basic setup of the experimental design. All other games were conducted in same manner. In this 
case, based on the card of player 2, player 1 decides how much to send of the Col. $20,000 given   40
as endowment for the pair. Player 2 decides weather to accept or reject such offer. Depending on 
that decision the funds are allocated as initially proposed and, if the offer is rejected, no payment 
is made to either player. 
Players 1 are in one location, and they are informed that players 2 are in another location. 
They do not see each other at any time, and their identities and decisions are kept confidential. 
Players 1 are seated at their desks and record their decisions privately on a decisions sheet 
(paper). Players 2 are invited the next day to come to campus. At that time, Players 2 are seated 
in a waiting room and called one at a time to a desk where a monitor verbally asks for decisions 
and records them on a decisions sheet (paper). The monitor then writes the decisions of each 
player 2 in each activity. At the end of the five activities all decisions are matched for 
determining the earnings in each interaction and activity. For the case of the Ultimatum game 
each player 1 will send three different offers to three players 2. An illustrative example is shown 
in Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1. Lab Setting for the Ultimatum Game 
First day  Second day  Third day 
YESTERDAY  TODAY TOMORROW 




Col.$2,000 for bus 
Invitation,  
Pre-game demographics,  
Col. $4,000 (show up fee) 
Game choices 










Estrato 2, Kennedy, Kennedy
Grupo de SISBEN al cual pertenece Total personas a cargo
Otro
Básica secundaria  2
Ninguno 3
Último nivel educativo aprobado Menores a cargo
Estado civil
Unión libre, vive con su cónyuge
Oficio y tiempo en el oficio
Desempleado hace 6 meses
A
La siguiente información es de la persona de la foto con la 
cual usted está jugando:
Lugar de nacimiento y Edad
San Martin, 52 años
Foto














Cargo que desempeña en la institución
1
La siguiente información es de la persona de la foto con la 
Edad








J2 Cards  Game choices 
 J1 Cards 
Game choices  
Game outcomes 
Receipts and post-game survey,  
Col. $2000 for bus 
Fourth day   Player 1  Receipts and post-game survey 
Allocate $20000
Accept / Reject   41
Site 1 (public servants) 















At the end of the session we selected randomly for each player at least one activity that 
would be paid in cash on top of the show-up fee that is paid to cover the transportation costs of 
each participant. On average players were paid for more than one activity, and this was common 
information for all players (see the protocols section of this in Appendix for details). Prior to 
making their decisions, players 1 and 2 received information about the other player in the 
particular interaction through the cards mentioned above. 
 
























Service providers (health centers, 
public schools, daycare centers, 
community kitchens): Workplace 
(80%) or campus lab (off-hours) 
Campus (70%) or centers for the 
attention of targeted populations 
(30%)  (20%)   42
The information that each player had on the other player in each interaction is shown in 
Table 5 below. 
Table 5. Information for the Players 
What Player 1 observed in 
Player 2 card 
What Player 2 observed in 
Player 1 card 
Photo 
Birthplace and age 
Marital status 
Occupation and time in it 
District, location and district 
stratification 
Number of dependents 
Dependents that are minors 




Education level (highest degree 
obtained) 
Service provider (health, 
education, child care, food) 
Years working in it 
Position 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Based on this information, the players were asked to make their decisions in each of the games. 
Recall that each participant played the same game with three different people. 
 
d. Sampling and Recruitment 
 
We conduct these experiments among the groups described in the proposal including local 
officials and beneficiaries of social services, as well as control groups. In most cases Player 1 
roles will be assigned to local officials and comparable control subjects, and the role of recipients 
will be played by people sampled from poor populations who are currently or potentially 
beneficiaries of social services. 
From now on we will use the terms “target” and “control” for our experiment 
participants. For “target” we will refer to those individuals involved in the direct process of 
application and delivery of social services. In the case pf players 1 the target sample will refer to 
those employed in the public service agencies to interact directly with the potential or actual 
beneficiaries of social services to the poor. These will include white-collar and blue-collar 
employees at the four types of agencies involved (education, health, child care and nutrition 
programs). Players 2 will be people who are applying, are eligible to apply or actually receive 
social services of these kinds. As for the controls, we will recruit citizens of the city with   43
different levels of education, income, occupation, and location of residence who can serve as 
control groups for players 1, 2 and 3. 
  For the recruitment of the participants we visited neighborhoods where potential 
beneficiaries apply for these social services or where they actually receive them. We additionally 
recruited local officials or employees for these government programs. Examples include health 
services for the poorest citizens, public pre-school and day care centers, and community kitchens 
and nutritional government programs. The groups to be included in the subject pool are: 
 
•  Potential, applicant and current beneficiaries of social protection services from 
populations. 
•  Local officials in Bogotá’s agencies that provide social services such as 
education, health, day care and nutrition. 
•  Surveyors usually hired by private contractors who conduct the SISBEN 
survey process for large cities and metropolitan areas. 
•  Controls (other government officials and citizens with demographic 
characteristics equivalent to those of the groups above). 
 
The following map shows the locations of the public agencies that we visited for 
recruiting Players 1. Later on there are more details of the types of agencies visited and the 
numbers of subjects recruited by agency. In general, these are the locations of the offices where 
potential and actual beneficiaries of social services attend to request or receive a service. They 
include offices for application to the programs or the actual delivery of them. In these locations 
we found delivery of social services including health, education, child care and food centers or 
kitchens, run by the national or municipal government. 
In the case of local officials, the confidentiality and privacy of data represent one of local 
officials is one of our major concerns in order to guarantee the revealing of preferences regarding 
fairness, altruism, and discrimination. Therefore, the identities of the local officials or their 
decisions are never revealed to the other players,and could not be observed by their superiors. In 
fact, we have tried to recruit more than one officer from each service provider we visited in the 
sample. 
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Figure 3. Recruitment of J1 in Bogotá by Geographical Location 
 
   Source: Authors’ compilation.  
For players 2 recruitment took place among the poor and more vulnerable groups around these 
and other locations in the city, based on its existing stratification for the city. 
The next table shows the geographical location (localidad) of the household for the entire 
sample of participants, and the percentages by player role.  
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Table 6. Geographical Location of Participants’ Households  
Localidad  N j3  j2  j1 
Antonio Nariño  20  0.0  85.0  15.0 
Barrios Unidos  6  33.3  16.7  50.0 
Bosa 17  5.9  58.8  35.3 
Candelaria 1  0.0  100.0  0.0 
Chapinero 54  25.9  59.3  14.8 
Ciudad Bolívar  33  0.0  51.5  48.5 
Engativá 43  32.6  7.0  60.5 
Fontibón 26  19.2  7.7  73.1 
Kennedy 35  25.7  17.1  57.1 
Mártires 5  20.0  40.0  40.0 
Puente Aranda  15  20.0  20.0  60.0 
Rafael Uribe  14  0.0  50.0  50.0 
San Cristóbal  38  0.0  71.1  28.9 
Santafé 39  10.3  64.1  25.6 
Suba 43  30.2  18.6  51.2 
Teusaquillo 25  28.0  20.0  52.0 
Tunjuelito 37  0.0  40.5  59.5 
Usaquén 36  33.3  16.7  50.0 
Usme 11  0.0  45.5  54.5 
Alrededores 15  40.0  20.0  40.0 
TOTAL 513  17.7  38.0  44.2 
 






Table 7. Players Who Attended the Sessions by Role 
Player Role  N 
% of total 
recruited  % Target Group  %Control Group 
1  227 90.8  75.33  24.67 
2  195 82.28  84.1  15.9 
3  91 97.85  100% 
TOTAL: 513   568 recruited   
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
In the following three tables we show the composition of our sample for Players 1, 2 and 
3 for both the target and controls to give an idea of the locations and occupations they have.  
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Table 8. Players 1 by Groups 
Target Group  Control Group 
Local Officers  N  %    N  % 
Mayor’s office  3  1.75  College Students  27  48.21 
Education
1 31  18.13  Private  sector
5 9  16.07 
Health
2 34  19.88  Government  (Central)
6 10  17.86 
Nutrition
3 28  16.37  Government  (District)
7 10  17.86 
Child Care
4 44  25.73       
Surveyers SISBEN  31  18.13       
Total 171 100    56  100 
 
1 Public schools and CADELs (Local Administrative Center for Education). 
2 ARSs 
(Administradora del Régimen Subsidiado), UPAs (Unidad Primaria de Atención), 
UBAs (Unidad Básicas de Atención), CAMIs (Centros de Atención Médica 
Inmediata). 
3 Community kitchens and COLs (Local Operative Center). 
4 Hogares 
comunitarios, daycare centers, kindergarten, Casas Vecinales, nursery schools.      
5 Universities and NGOs. 
6 DNP (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) 
7 SGD (Secretaría de Gobierno Distrital), SHD (Secretaría de Hacienda Distrital) 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Table 9. Players 2 by Groups 
Target Group  Control Group 
   N  %     N  % 
Displaced people  43  26.22  Students  27  87.10 
People with disabilities  4  2.44  Private sector
1 4  12.90 
Indigenous 1  0.61  Black  6  19.35 
Excombatiente 34  20.73  SISBEN  3  9.68 
Recycler 18  10.98       
Street vendor  12  7.32       
Black 25  15.24       
SISBEN  107  65.24          
Total 164        31   
 
1 Universities and NGOs.  
Source: Authors. 
 
Table 10. Players 3 by Groups 
Target Group  Control Group 
Officers N  %    N  % 
Government (Central)
1 38  90.48  Students  30  61.22 
Government (District)
2 1  2.38  Private  sector
5 13  26.53 
Congress 1  2.38  Street  6  12.24 
Internacional Organizations
3 2  4.76      
Total  42  100   49 100 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
1 Ministerio de Comunicaciones, Ministerio de Hacienda, Ministerio de Minas y 
Energía, Super Intendencia Financiera, DIAN (Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas 
Nacionales), CGR (Contraloría General de la República), FOSYGA (Fondo de 
Solidaridad y Garantías). 
2 SGD (Secretaria de Gobierno Distrital) 
3 CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina) 
5 Universities and NGOs 
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To give an idea of the socio-economic status of the players recruited, we show in the 
tables below the household expenditures (Col. Pesos and in US dollars) reported by players for 
both the target and control sub samples. 
 
Table 11. Players’ Monthly Household Expenditures by Role (US$) 
Target Control  Role Player 
1 2  3 1 2 3 
Mean  293.22 135.19  678.25 906.10 580.10 1,147.70 
Min 20.08  7.23  120.45  120.45  120.45  100.38 
Max 3,613.50  401.50  2,409.00  4,015.00 2,409.00 6,022.50 
Desvest 309.11  698.14  502.21 817.35 490.16 1,434.74 
 
TRM: 1US$=COL$2490,66 (Monthly mean average for May to July 2006, according to  
http//:www.banrep.gov.co)  
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
It is also interesting to observe the kind of aid and welfare benefits our players 2 receive 
from the government through different social services programs. The following table shows 
these benefits, based on the demographic survey we filled for each participant (see appendix for 
the questionnaire) 
 
Table 12. Welfare Benefits of Target population (Players 2) 
  Target Control 
1. Possession of an aid program certificate 
SISBEN Certificate  52.63  9.67 
Ex- combatant Certificate  29.82  0 
Displaced aid program Certificate  11.4  0 
Familias en Acción Program  3.51 0 
2. Use of welfare programs 
People receiving benefits from public programs  79.27 29.03 
Education
1 56.92  88.89 
Nutrition
2 29.23  0 
Health
3 84.62  33.33 
Child Care
4 17.05  0 
 
1 Public schools and CADELs (Local Administrative Center for Education) 
2 Community kitchens and COLs (Local Operative Center) 
3 ARSs (Administradora del Régimen Subsidiado), UPAs (Unidad Primaria de 
Atención), UBAs (Unidad Básicas de Atención), CAMIs (Centros de Atención 
Médica Inmediata) 
4 Hogares comunitarios, daycare centers, kindergarten, Casas Vecinales, nursery 
schools.      
Source: Authors’ compilation.   48
d.  Socio-Demograhic Characteristics of Players 
 
The following pages show a series of characteristics for the samples of participants. Recall that 
only the information in the card (see sample) was known to the other player. The rst of the data 
provided completes the characterization of our samples. 
 
Table 13. Players 2 Characteristics Observed by Players 1 
                     Target Control 
           Mean 31,98  22,39 
           Min  65  32 
           Max  16  18 
          
Age 
SD 12,87 3,56 
           single  39,63  96,77 
           married  7,93  3,23 
           union  36,59  0,00 
           Divorced  3,66  0 
















Widow 12,2  0 
           Working  51,22  16,13 
           Studying  15,85  83,87 
            looking for a job  21,95  0 
                 home work  7,93  0 
 Target Control  Disabled  1,83  0 










Other 1,22  0  Gender 
Male 42,07 41,94   Private  sector  27  100 
Black  15,24 19,35   Jornalero o peón  1,12  0 






Meztizo 76,83 80,65   Home  worker  6,74  0 
Yes  65,24 9,68   Professional worker    1,12  0  SISBEN 
No 34,76 90,32   Independent  worker    59,55  0 















1  39,62 0  Mean 4,78  10,26 
2  13,21 33,33  Min  0  0,02 
















03 3 , 3 3  
Time in that activity 
SD 8,29  7,67 
Mean 2,62 5,35   0  13,5 0 
Min 0 4   1  26,99 3,23 
Max 6 8   2  25,77 9,68 
Level 
SD 0,79 0,8   3  17,79 54,84 
Mean 8,15 17,26   4  15,95 19,35 
Min 0 15   5  0 6,45 























SD 3,57 0,77   Mean 1,98  0,00 
Other     Min  0  0 
Displaced people  38,39 0   Max  7  0 
People with disabilities  3,57 0  
Dependents 
SD 1,85  0,00 
Excombatiente 30,36 0   Mean 1,54  0,00 
Indigenous 0,89 0   Min  0  0 
Recycler 16,07 0   Max  6  0 
Street vendor 
Mean 
10,71 0  
Children 





Estrato 2, Kennedy, Kennedy
Grupo de SISBEN al cual pertenece Total personas a cargo
Otro
Básica secundaria  2
Ninguno 3
Último nivel educativo aprobado Menores a cargo
Estado civil
Unión libre, vive con su cónyuge
Oficio y tiempo en el oficio
Desempleado hace 6 meses
A
La siguiente información es de la persona de la foto con la 
cual usted está jugando:
Lugar de nacimiento y Edad
San Martin, 52 años
Foto
Estrato, Barrio y Localidad en el cual vive
 
Source: Authors’ compilation.   49
Table 14. Players 1 Characteristics Observed by Players 2 
 
                   Target Control 
         Mean  34,3  25,9 
         Min  55  54 
         Max  17  17 
        
Age 
SD 8,43  8,79 
         Women  57,93  58,06 





   Only Target  N  %   Mean  4,46  5,71 
Officers  176 77,53   Min  2  3 
Education1  35 19,89   Max  8  8 
CADEL   22,86   
Level 
SD 1,63  1,36 
CED     60,00    Mean  14,53  17,45 
Nutrition3  28 15,91   Min  4  12 
COL   21,95    Max  20  20 












SD 3,91  1,66 
IDIPRON     25,00    Mean  5,49   3,48  
Health2  34 19,31   Min  0,08  0,03 
CAMI   17,65    Max  33  22 
UBA   29,41   
Time in the 
activity 
SD 5,88  4,88 
UPA     26,47    Private sector5 18,13  6,90 
Child Care4  54 30,68   For  the  government6 81,87  93,10 
jardinDABS   61,11    Blue  collar 36,43  7,14 







































Cargo que desempeña en la institución
1
La siguiente información es de la persona de la foto con la 
Edad




1 Public schools and CADELs (Local Administrative Center for Education) 
2 ARSs (Administradora del Régimen Subsidiado), UPAs (Unidad Primaria de Atención), UBAs (Unidad Básicas de 
Atención), CAMIs (Centros de Atención Médica Inmediata) 
3 Community kitchens and COLs (Local Operative Center) 
4 Hogares comunitarios, daycare centers, kindergarten, Casas Vecinales, nursery schools.      
5 Universities and NGOs 
6 DNP (Departamento Nacional de Planeación), SGD (Secretaría de Gobierno Distrital), SHD (Secretaría de 
Hacienda Distrital) 





As noted above, each player received her earnings from at least one of the five games and a 
maximum of three games, randomly selected. The final frequency of each game being paid to 
each player is reported in the table below. Since in the 3PP game we needed to pay at least player 
3, and we wanted to pay all players when a game was selected, all players 1 and 2 involved in the   50
3PP were paid. Those players who were not paid the 3PP were paid for one of the other 
activities. 
Table 15. Frequency of Payments by Activity 
Activity  Role 
Player  DDG  DG UG TG 3PP 
1  19.33 14.29 18.07 13.03 39.08 
2  59.09 14.05 16.94 12.81 39.26 
3  - - - - 100.00 
Total  33.04 11.89 14.69 10.84 48.95 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
The final earnings, without show-up fee, are reported in the following tables. Overall, US$2,700 
were paid to the 513 people who participated. Every player received also a show-up fee of 
Col.$4,000 (US$1.6). 
Table 16. Earnings (US$) by Role
1 
Type 
Player  Mean Max  Min  Sum  Desvest 
1  3.71 10.40  0.00 862  1.80 
2  6.60 16.00  0.00 1.504  3.07 
3  3.84 4.00 3.20 354  0.32 
Total  4.93 16.00  0.00 2.719  2.69 
1 An activity was not paid for when the participant did not 
attend the session. Earnings do not include the show-up fee 
($4.000 = US$1.60) paid to each participant. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
 
e.  Social Efficiency and Equity across Games 
 
The tables below report the social efficiency and equity statistics for each of the games and for 
the two major types of (player 1-player 2) interactions by samples. These interactions consist of, 
target-target, control-control, target-control and control-target. 
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Table 18. Social Efficiency and Equity in DG, UG, TG, 3PP 
General 
Number of Observations  557  558 559 444 2,118 
Mean  100%  89% 83% 93% 91% 
Maximum 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Minimum 1.00  0.00 0.50 0.73 0.00 
Real social efficiency 
Standard Deviation  0.00  0.30 0.13 0.11 0.18 
Mean  54%  62% 61% 36% 53% 
Maximum 1.00  1.00 1.00 0.66 1.00 
Minimum 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Player 2´s Equity 
Standard Deviation  0.28  0.24 0.17 0.15 0.24 
Target: Players 1. 2 
Number of Observations  364  360 363 283 1,370 
Mean  100%  89% 83% 92% 91% 
Maximum 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Minimum 1.00  0.00 0.50 0.73 0.00 
Real social efficiency 
Standard Deviation  0.00  0.30 0.13 0.11 0.18 
Mean  52%  62% 61% 35% 52% 
Maximum 1.00  1.00 1.00 0.66 1.00 
Minimum 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Player 2´s Equity 
Standard Deviation  0.27  0.23 0.17 0.15 0.24 
Control: Players 1. 2 
Number of Observations  52  57 53 28 190 
Mean  100%  80% 76% 99% 88% 
Maximum 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Minimum 1.00  0.00 0.50 0.73 0.00 
Real social efficiency 
Standard Deviation  0.00  0.30 0.12 0.05 0.24 
Mean  42%  61% 57% 32% 48% 
Maximum 1.00  1.00 0.93 0.66 1.00 
Minimum 0.00  0.30 0.13 0.00 0.00 
Player 2´s Equity 
Standard Deviation  0.25  0.21 0.16 0.12 0.22 
Control: Players 1 - Target: Players 2 
Number of Observations  98  99 99 84 380 
Mean  100%  94% 87% 93% 94% 
Maximum 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Minimum 1.00  0.00 0.50 0.73 0.00 
Real social efficiency 
Standard Deviation  0.00  0.22 0.12 0.11 0.14 
Mean  70%  71% 68% 44% 62% 
Maximum 1.00  1.00 1.00 0.66 1.00 
Minimum 0.00  0.10 0.35 0.00 0.00 
Player 2´s Equity 
Standard Deviation  0.28  0.23 0.16 0.16 0.24 
Source: Authors. 
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TABLE 26.
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1 if player 1 is Target -0,03 -0,049 -0,193 -0,034 -0,206
1 if player 2 is Target 0.225* 0.214*
1 if player 1&2 are Target -0,071 -0,059 -0,167 -0,022 -0,129
1 if player is woman -0,024
Age 0.002+
Player's level of education  -0,003
Player's time worked multiplied by dummy of Target P1 -0,002
Player 1´s - Player 2's Household expenses per capita 
(in Colombian thousand pesos) 00 0 0 00 0
1 if Player 2 is a woman  -0,019 -0,013 -0,06 -0,052 -0,052 -0,041
Player 2´s age 0 0 0 0,001 0 0,001
1 if Player 2 is single  -0.130* -0.139* -0.115+ -0,115 -0,101 -0.106+
1 if Player 2 is in common law  -0.060+ -0.070** -0.150+ -0,141 -0,138 -0,128
Player 2´s years of education -0.017+ -0,01 -0.040* -0.034+ -0.041* -0.031**
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge 0,016 0,013 0.022+ 0,01 0.026** 0,018
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0,038 0,04 0.166** 0.160+ 0.157** 0.160+
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0,031 0.056+ -0,042 0,013 -0,014 0,017
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous -0,06 -0.098** -0,061 -0,05 -0,021 -0,055
1 if Player 2 is a Displaced 0.150* 0,064 0.233* 0,094 0.151* 0,065
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant 0,013 0,052 0,039 0,02 0,015 0,055
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker 0,054 0,028 0,13 0,062 0,06 0,05
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor 0.131* 0.118** 0.141* 0.127** 0.141* 0.133**
1 if Player 2 is a woman  0,038 0,032
Player 2´s age 00
1 if Player 2 is single  -0,019 -0,032
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0,126 0,099
Player 2´s years of education 0,028 0,033
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge -0,013 0,003
1 if Player 2 is unemployed -0.146+ -0,133
Player 1´s - Player 2's Household expenses per capita 
(in Colombian thousand pesos) 00
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0.108+ 0,072
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous 0,01 -0,034
1 if Player 2 is a Displaced -0,111 -0,049
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant -0,032 0,052
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker -0,081 -0,022
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor 00
1 if Player 2 is a woman  0,033 0,02
Player 2´s age 0 -0,001
1 if Player 2 is single  -0,031 -0,045
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0,113 0,077
Player 2´s years of education 0.037+ 0,034
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge -0,017 -0,01
1 if Player 2 is unemployed -0,141 -0,146
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0,076 0,079
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous -0,042 -0,017
Constant 0.416* 0.389* 0.657* 0.489* 0.609* 0.809* 0.513* 0.746* 0.767* 0.502* 0.682*
Interactions 578 578 578 578 578 578 578 578 578 578 578
R-squared 0,112 0,122 0,156 0,103 0,204 0,206 0,129 0,254 0,203 0,109 0,251
































































































































































   53
TABLE 27.
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1 if player 1 is Target -0,078 -0,089 -0,167 -0,006 -0,161
1 if player 2 is Target 0.110+ 0,093
1 if player 1&2 are Target 0,078 0,099 -0,209 0,036 -0,16
1 if player is woman -0,009
Age 0,002
Player's level of education  0.017**
Player's time worked multiplied by dummy of Target P1 -0,001
Player 1´s - Player 2's Household expenses per capita 
(in Colombian thousand pesos) 00 00 0 0 0
1 if Player 2 is a woman  -0,018 0,003 -0,071 -0,098 -0,065 -0,064
Player 2´s age 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,001 0,002
1 if Player 2 is single  -0,035 -0,034 -0,017 0,054 0,007 0,002
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0,003 0,003 -0,131 -0,12 -0,104 -0,106
Player 2´s years of education -0,014 -0,001 -0,031 -0,032 -0.043** -0,03
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge 0,019 0,008 0,004 0,002 0,007 -0,002
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0,027 0,001 0,049 -0,015 0,042 0,004
1 if Player 2 considers herself black -0,048 -0,037 -0,074 -0,072 -0,053 -0,031
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous 0,052 0,035 0,238 0.309+ 0.272+ 0.268+
1 if Player 2 is a Displaced 0.168* 0.132* 0,153 0,116 0.156* 0.127*
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant 0,001 0,04 0,003 -0,078 -0,013 0,015
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker 0.099** 0.083+ 0.180** 0.244+ 0.086+ 0,084
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor 0,107 0,081 0,109 0,08 0,09 0,088
1 if Player 2 is a woman  0,071 0,117
Player 2´s age 0 -0,002
1 if Player 2 is single  -0,026 -0,094
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0,147 0,139
Player 2´s years of education 0,022 0,033
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge 0,016 0,011
1 if Player 2 is unemployed -0,023 0,024
Player 1´s - Player 2's Household expenses per capita 
(in Colombian thousand pesos) 0.000* 0.000*
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0,04 0,037
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous -0,205 -0.299+
1 if Player 2 is a Displaced 0,016 -0,005
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant -0,01 0,117
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker -0,093 -0,192
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor 00
1 if Player 2 is a woman  0,072 0,089
Player 2´s age 0 -0,002
1 if Player 2 is single  -0,045 -0,033
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0,12 0,123
Player 2´s years of education 0.049+ 0,047
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge 0,012 0,009
1 if Player 2 is unemployed -0,021 -0,002
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0,009 -0,008
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous -0,253 -0.245+
Constant 0.486* 0.357* 0.574* 0.528* 0.497* 0.707* 0.534* 0.651* 0.700* 0.511* 0.614*
Interactions 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580
R-squared 0,049 0,067 0,07 0,087 0,103 0,103 0,095 0,148 0,095 0,097 0,133
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TABLE 28.
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1 if player 1 is Target 0,061 0,091 -0,227 -0,009 -0,386
1 if player 2 is Target 0.210* 0.206*
1 if player 1&2 are Target -0,099 -0,096 -0,173 0,035 -0,131
1 if player is woman -0,025
Age 0
Player's level of education  0.016+
Player's time worked multiplied by dummy of Target P1 -0,003
Player 1´s - Player 2's Household expenses per capita 
(in Colombian thousand pesos) 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
1 if Player 2 is a woman  0,032 0,028 -0,002 -0,02 0,049 0,053
Player 2´s age 0 0 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 0
1 if Player 2 is single  0,013 0,014 -0,035 -0,03 -0,067 -0,053
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0,029 0,018 0 0,009 -0,015 -0,064
Player 2´s years of education -0,019 -0,016 -0,041 -0,054 -0,025 -0,026
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge 0.034* 0.034* 0,014 -0,012 0,016 0,008
1 if Player 2 is unemployed 0,014 0,037 0.163+ 0.170+ 0.160+ 0,158
1 if Player 2 considers herself black -0,039 -0,032 -0,139 -0,091 -0,023 0,001
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous -0,005 -0,045 0,073 0,03 0,116 0,119
1 if Player 2 is a Displaced 0.073** -0,006 0.164** 0,103 0.064+ 0,013
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant -0,032 0,003 -0,035 -0,093 -0,045 -0,023
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker 0.139* 0.096** -0,017 -0,082 0.125* 0.088+
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor -0,005 -0,021 -0,002 -0,009 -0,021 -0,02
1 if Player 2 is a woman  0,034 0,05
Player 2´s age 0,001 0,002
1 if Player 2 is single  0,051 0,036
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0,036 0,007
Player 2´s years of education 0,039 0,059
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge 0,023 0,051
1 if Player 2 is unemployed -0.184+ -0,152
Player 1´s - Player 2's Household expenses per capita 
(in Colombian thousand pesos) 0,000 0,000
1 if Player 2 considers herself black 0,132 0,076
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous -0,085 -0,083
1 if Player 2 is a Displaced -0,109 -0,123
1 if Player 2 is an Ex-combatant 0,000 0,115
1 if Player 2 is a Recycling worker 0.181** 0.207+
1 if Player 2 is a Street vendor 0,000 0,000
1 if Player 2 is a woman  -0,028 -0,037
Player 2´s age 0,001 0
1 if Player 2 is single  0,101 0,096
1 if Player 2 is in common law  0,058 0,102
Player 2´s years of education 0,033 0,032
Player 2´s number of minor people in charge 0,022 0,027
1 if Player 2 is unemployed -0.187+ -0,163
1 if Player 2 considers herself black -0,024 -0,067
1 if Player 2 considers herself indigenous -0,149 -0.176+
Constant 0.261* 0.186* 0.410* 0.394* 0.388* 0.572* 0.401* 0.686** 0.498* 0.379* 0.471*
Interactions 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455
R-squared 0,05 0,066 0,076 0,047 0,095 0,094 0,064 0,125 0,094 0,052 0,116











































Percentage of the allocation expected by Player 3 from Player 1 in 3PP
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